The potential to collect brain data more directly, with higher resolution, and in greater amounts has heightened worries about mental and brain privacy. In order to manage the risks to individuals posed by these privacy challenges, some have suggested codifying new privacy rights, including a right to “mental privacy.” In this paper, we consider these arguments and conclude that while neurotechnologies do raise significant privacy concerns, such concerns are—at least for now—no different from those raised by other well-understood data collection (...) technologies, such as gene sequencing tools and online surveillance. To better understand the privacy stakes of brain data, we suggest the use of a conceptual framework from information ethics, Helen Nissenbaum’s “contextual integrity” theory. To illustrate the importance of context, we examine neurotechnologies and the information flows they produce in three familiar contexts—healthcare and medical research, criminal justice, and consumer marketing. We argue that by emphasizing what is distinct about brain privacy issues, rather than what they share with other data privacy concerns, risks weakening broader efforts to enact more robust privacy law and policy. (shrink)

Medical interventions are usually categorized as “invasive” when they involve piercing the skin or inserting an object into the body. Beyond this standard definition, however, there is little discussion of the concept of invasiveness in the medical literature, despite evidence that the term is used in ways that do not reflect the standard definition of medical invasiveness. We interviewed psychiatrists, patients with depression, and members of the public without depression to better understand their views on the invasiveness of several psychiatric (...) electroceutical interventions (treatments that involve electrical or magnetic stimulation of the brain) for the treatment of depression. Our study shows that people recognize several kinds of invasiveness: physical, emotional, and lifestyle. In addition, several characteristics of therapies influence how invasive they are perceived to be; these include the perceived capacity of an intervention to result in harm; how localized the effects of the intervention are; the amount of control retained by the person receiving the intervention; how permanent its effects are perceived as being; and how familiar it seemed to participants. Our findings contribute to a small literature on the concept of invasiveness, which emphasizes that categorizing an intervention as invasive, or as noninvasive, evokes a variety of other normative considerations, including the potential harm it poses and how it compares to other potential therapies. It may also draw attention away from other salient features of the intervention. (shrink)

Gilbert et al. argue that discussions of self-related changes in patients undergoing DBS are overblown. They show that there is little evidence that these changes occur frequently and make recommendations for further research. We point out that their framing of the issue, their methodology, and their recommendations do not attend to other important questions about these changes.

Deep brain stimulation (DBS) uses electrodes implanted in the brain to modulate dysregulated brain activity related to a variety of neurological and psychiatric conditions. A number of people who use DBS have reported changes that affect their sense of self. In the neuroethics literature, there has been significant debate over the exact nature of these changes. More recently, there have been suggestions that this debate is overblown and detracts from clinically-relevant ways of understanding these effects of DBS. In this paper, (...) we offer an alternative approach to understanding the effects of DBS on the self, drawing on John Sadler’s work on self-illness ambiguity. We argue that self-illness ambiguity is a complex concept, with at least three different aspects, and that each of the three aspects we identify also characterizes one kind of DBS-related change. Our analysis also suggests ways of helping patients to adjust to life as a DBS user. (shrink)

Neuroscience's accelerating advances have reached a pivotal point in the study of the human brain, including neurotechnologies capable of recording large amounts of data and acting with greater precision. However, the use of neurotechnology has raised a number of ethical, legal, and social implications (ELSI). To that end, sufficiently robust policy and governance structures must be considered. To date, no published review of United States policies governing neuroscience and neurotechnology exists. To address this, we review US polices and various ethical (...) frameworks overseeing neuroscience and neurotechnology. This policy review highlights where gaps in neuroscience and neurotechnology policy and governance might exist. Overall, our review shows that “soft policies” make up the present-day US neurotech-governance universe at the federal level, with neurodata specific state-legislation emerging. The included analysis can aid researchers, technology developers, neuroethicists, research ethicists, legal scholars, and others in facilitating ethically and socially responsible implementation of neuroscience and neurotechnology as they move from “bench to bedside and beyond.”. (shrink)

A significant goal of neuroethics is to offer neuroscientists, health care providers, law- and policy-makers and others, ways of thinking and acting on matters relevant to brain health and conditions that affect the central nervous system. This goal and related calls to action have been derived from theory or empirical work and bring different levels of normative force. To bring the latter in particular to the foreground of discussion, we explored for this Policy Forum different calls to action as they (...) are associated with chosen terminology, the definitions of terms, origins to which they are benchmarked, locations in text, and targeted audiences. We find variability on all of these factors as they appear in the original foundational journals for neuroethics: AJOB Neuroscience and Neuroethics. We recommend that for a field whose very existence relies on uptake of advice, better consistency of language will improve credibility, acceptance, and implementation. (shrink)

Since its introduction, electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) has been controversial. Recently, a report by the World Health Organization called for an ECT ban for children and adolescents. This has added a new layer to consider in the debate about the ethical use of ECT. To better understand ethical concerns and attitudes toward the use of ECT in this population, and to assess whether a ban might be justified, we conducted a comprehensive literature review. Close to 75% of our analyzed papers reported (...) agreement about ECT’s effectiveness for treating a wide range of adolescent mental disorders. Almost half of the papers reported memory side effects as an ethical concern. In addition, the lack of rigorous side-effect reporting was found to be a key barrier to the ethical use of ECT in this population. We hope this review will advance our understanding of ongoing ethical concerns and barriers regarding use of ECT in adolescents. (shrink)